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INTRODUCTION
In Early 1977, officials of the City of Baltimore beoame
concerned over the capacity of the Fire Department to r_spond
to fires occurring simultaneously in different parts of the
city. Only a few week_ earlier, a school had burned down
because fire apparatus could not respond quickly enough to
both the school fire and others elsewhere in the city. It
se_med obvious to these officials that technology could help
the response problem. It had done so in other cities such
as San Francisco. _ But what type of tec|inology? At what cost?
And how to insure that things would not go wrong--that a new
system would really do the job? (In some other cities, expensive
installations had been made, but the _ problems
remained unsolved.) 2
What concerned Baltimore, then, was a situation common
to city government--a general feeling that applying technology
might help solve a problem, coupled wi_/% an apprehension that
decid±ng to go for a technology-intensive solution might be
very costly and might not yield good results.
The apprehension of Baltimore was well founded. By
1977, many state and local governments had participated in
federally sponsored "technology transfer" programs in which
enthusiastic federal scientists and engineers sought to apply
advanced technology to their problems. It seined that when-
aver a new technology was perfected in a federal research and
development program, an attempt was made to bring it to the
attention of state and local officials and to urge that there
must be a problem which could be solved by application of
that technology.
Often the results of these efforts were disappointing.
In the rush to identify problems and push technology at them,
important factors were overlooked and obstacles were under-
estimated. Such episodes made state and local officials
wary of technology transfer because too often the outcome
amounted to a financial and political liability. Even when
problems were solved, unanticipated consequences caused a
net loss for the state and locality, in the opinion of offi-
cials. In short, when there is an excess of "technology push,"
when inappropriate technology is applied, or when the state
or local government cannot "follow through" on the technology
due to lack of available money or expertise, the experience of
technology transfer may be disastrous or at least very uncom-
fortable for the state or local government. 3
Nevertheless, the promise of a technological solution-_
especially when a problem is urgent--combined with the con -_
cern that a state or locality may be accused of being behind
the times or uninterested in innovation--prompts state and
1
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local officials to try tecl_ology _pplic_tion.
For Baltimore officials, however, the question of
whether to chance a teeh**ological solution, or to risk keeping
the old system with minor changes, did not seem to be an
insoluble dile_?_k%. Baltimore had a sourc_ of advice andcounsel on such questions which lessened the probability
that a poor choice would be made. Baltimore had an established
relationship for technical asslstance with the National Aero-
nautics and &pace Administration's (NASA) Goddard Space Flight
Center (GSFC).
I In 1974, Baltimore officials noticed an item _n theNew York Times concerning the assignment o 4 a _ASA technology
_solve problems in New York Caty. _ Why could not: NASA do the same for Balti ore, especially since Baltim re was
located only 30 miles from the Goddard Centor? Baltimore con-
tacted NASA. Within months, Baltimore and CSFC signed an
agreement. It provided that GSFC would give technical assis-
tance to Baltimore "_o test the feasibility and to measure
the effects of utilising technology in the solutions of pro-
blems:..that affect _he urban environment generally and...
adminlstrators in Baltimore specifically. ''_
!
The general approach of this continuing cooperative
venture--known as the Baltimore Applications Project (BAP)--
calls for GSFC to "review and analyze" those areas of partic-
ular concern to Baltimore officials "for the purpose of
applying existing NASA technology or that developed by other
federal research and development activities. "6 A GSFC
engineer--called a technologist in residence--is assigned to
the Mayor's office. The agreement also makes a variety of
NASA resources available to Baltimore, including "professional
expertise at NASA laboratories."
From 1974 to 1977, BAP assisted Baltimor_ in over 50
tasks. As Baltimore officials saw it, BAP provided a source
of objective help. A sense of trust and mutual respect had
developed. The technologist in residence--Thomas Golden-- was
regarded by Baltimore officials with esteem. Be never tried
i to push a technology or to appear to have a superior under-
i standing of the city's needs and problems.
He was interested in listening to city officials and
I finding ways to solve problems through mutual cooperation
whether technology was involved or not.
This was the context in which the Baltimore mayor's
office asked BAP to assist it with the Fire Depar_,ent dis-
patch and response problem.
2
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PURPOSE
The_ purpose of this report is to present a ease study
of the Bal_imore Fire Dispatuh l'rr)ject. The Case ;_tudy was
perfcrvaed under the terms of NASA-GSFC purchase order S-661_].B°
The case study has the following objectives'- (I) to
describe the Fire Dispatch Project, w.ith special attention
to the role and cont_'ibutions of the BAP, (2) to analyze the
process of technology application involved in the project,
with special emphasis on the value of an arrangement such as
the _AP in increasing chances for successful problem solving
in city government, (3) _o make findings and reoozmmendations
concerI_ing application of technology to u%ban government
problems similar to the Fire Dispatch Project.
SCOPE
This report is limited to a case study of the Fire
Dispatch Project. The time period studied is 1977-80. No
attempt is made to study the _ntire BAP program Or the gener_l
area of urban technology application. Nevertheless, since the
Fire Dispatch Project was carried out through the BAP and
constituted an instance of applying technology to an urban
problem, some attention must be given to these topi¢s in order
to fully describe and analyze the Fire Dispatch Project.
Therefore, consideration is given to the nature and
characteristics of the BAP, the interaction and interpersonal
relationships of Baltimore officials an_ BAP technologists
in residence and the characteristics and elea_ents of the
technology application process which bear on the Fire Dispatch
Project.
Because +-his case study has many facets, it is approached
I from four perspective. _ corresponding to the interests ofgovernment officials or academic observers. These are:
I) Fire service Perspective. (Fire dispatch improvement
through t_c-hno 16 gy a p-p-l_cat l-on?.)
2) Technolo_._ _ransferperspective. (Urban problem solu-
tion throu#_ assoc_-a_-ion--o_acity and an outside source with
expertise in technology.)
3) p_lic a_.!nistratio_n perspective. (Urban government
and intergoger_enta]:- rela-£-ions-_-uhderstanding how to apply
technology to urban problems. )
4) Innovation perspective. (Capacity to accept and incor-
porate e_feCtive_; appr0ic_'s and methods for conducting
urban government. )
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METIODOLOGY
The description section of _he cas_ study was based on
several sources Of information. Thsse included_ [I) official
documents and reports of the BAP, the City of BaltimQre, and
GSFC, (2) persQnel interviews with key partioipants in the
Fire Dispatch Project, and knowledgeable observers including
officials in the Mayor's office, the Fire Department, other
city agencies, GSFC staff, contractors, and persons in _ederal
agencies_ interest groups, unions, community groups and pro-
fessional societies, (3) newspaper, magazines and community
and internal Fire Department newsletters, (4) literature on
urban technology application and trans£er, including scholarly
st'_di@s, journal artioles and reports of the National Science
Foundation and other federal agencies, (5) literature oh fire
service innovation, (6) literature on urban government, (7)
interviews with officials in fire depar%m%ents in other cities
with modernized fire dispatch systems (e.g., Los Angeles, San
Francisco).
The analysis, findings and recommendations sections of
the report draw upon the sources re_erred to above and also
on the literature of urban technology.application, especially
works of W. Henry Lambrigh% I and R. Yln. _ These scholars
emphasize that successful application of technology in urban
government is largely a function of th_ urban decision_making
process. The decision-making process is of especially great
significance in determining whether the innovation becomes
i incorporated or routinized.
SIGNIFICANCE
Improved utilization of technology by urban governments
is an important goal of the federal, state and local govern-
ments. Experience with technology application indicates that
i_ is very difficult and _ubjeot to both expected and unexpected
obstaoles. Although numerous studies of the general problem
• and of specific eases of urban technology application have been
. made, there is little agreement on what are the bes_ approaches
i for successful application or on what the role of the federal
government should be. 9 And, although many of the previous
case studies provide important information on the process of
technology application, there is general agreement on the
need for additional case studies, especially of cases in
large cities.
Among the specific reasons for this case study are:
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l) Relatively few previous case studies deal with
application of "hard technology," as oppeued to innovations
in educatio_a, manag_tlent, systelas methedol_gy, etc.
2) Most previous case studies deal with small a_d
medium sized U.S. cities, rather tha,_ large populatle,_s of
approximately one million or more.
3) This ks the first full case study of a BAP project.
Previous BAP case studies have been quita limited and have
been called "mini.-cases. ''10
A full _ase study o£ a BAP project assumes added signifi-
cance today in view of recent federal legislation. Athough
there is still much controversy over how the federal government
can best aid technology application by state and local govern-
ment, in October 1980 Congress enacted 2ublio Law 96-480. This law
requires large federal research and development (R&D) labora-
tories to (i) establish offices of research and tec_%ology
applications to promote use of technologies developed in their
laboratories by privat_ industry and state and local government,
(2) devote 0.5 percent of their R&D budgets to promote transfer
of federal technology, (3) have at least on_ professional full-
time staff member in its office of applications.
BAP is one model, amdng many, which federal laboratories
could adopt in implementing this act. This case study should
clarify the advantages and drawbacks of this mod_l.
This case study is significant in view of action by the
Reagan administration to reduce funding for technology trans-
fer. With less funding available it becomes crucial to
determine which types of technology application are most
beneficial to urban communities.
Finally, this case study is significant becaus _t
attempts to view the process of technology application from
both the standpoint of the provider of technical assistance
(GSFC) and the user--the City of Baltimore. Most previous
case studies have been provider oriented.
DESCRIPTION
The origins of the Fire Dispatch Project can be traced
to early 1977 when a fire engulfed the Roland Park Country
School in North Baltimore. In\_stigation indicated that thefire burned out of control because dispatchers could not
_ locate and dispatch fare equipment in time to save the school.
This inability arose not from lack of competence or
} slowness of the dispatchers, but rather from the lack of com-
munications and dispatch capacity of the manual system installed
<
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in 1960. With the manual system, in cases where the closest
fire equipm_nt was not available, it was necessary for the
dispatcher te call each fire station to determine the s_atus
of its equipment. Further, the dis_atcher was required to
locate the address of the fire on a wall map a_d relate it
to the location of the nearest fire station, and then to
call that fire station to dispatch equipment. If the nearest
equipment was not available at the station called first, the
dispatcher would have to locate the next closest station and
call, and so forth. When two or more fires o_ fire alarms
occurred simultaneously or even within minutes of one anoth(_r,
the length of time needed to locate and dispatch the necessary
equipment could stretch %o several minutes. While the munual
system worked well enough for Instances of isolated fires, it
was li_erally overwhelmed by heavy activity.
Wi_ fire alarms _n the city growing at a rapid rate,
the instances of h_avy activity wer_ also increasing quickly.
Nevertheless, the motivotion to modernize m_ght not have come
in 1977 were it not for the fact that the head of the school
board in the district in which the burned down school was
located was Calhoun Bond, a distinguish_/ a_to_ney from one
of the oldest and most influential families in Baltimore.
Bond was also head o_ the Baltimore Fire Board. The Board
oversaw and made policy £or the Baltimore Fire Department.
The Board's three m_mbers were unpaid and served part-time.
They paid close attention to the Department's operations,
including communications and dispatch, but there was little
push for change until the school fire. From that point on,
however, Bond and other Board members pressured Department
personnel to move towaxd modernization. The Department it-
self had considered requesting funds for installing a new
dispatch system, but had not done so prior to 1977.* The
political and financial climate did not seem _avorable.
As fire officials saw it, there was little prospeeu of
funding for fire dispatch modification. The City had other
pressing priorities. The interest of Bond and the Fire Board,
however, changed the picture. Bond was close to the Mayor
and had good access to him (the Fire Chief at th_ time had
a pro forma relationship with the Mayor). City Hall became
receptive to the idea.
_t was at that time that the Mayor's Office asked for
BAP assistance. In 1977, BAP had been in existence for 3 years.
It had handled approximately 50 tasks. The dispatch project,
*Interviews indicated that there was skepticism among
some Fire Department officials as to che need for and effec _
tiveness of computer aided dispatch systems.
6
1981017341-TSA11
however, was onu Qf the first to involve help in the incest±-
cation of al_er_latiw_ t_h_li_'_l s_lutions that ;tlso lllvolved
implem_ntation of the chc_sen s_llltio,_ in an ;_re& of high
G_!C l/_a_l cunuontr:ated m¢_r_ onprierlty. Ill _arlier years, '_ '_'
tasks enlpl_sizing problem id_ntificatiuB and needs a@s£_sumunt.
rfhis was to he the first imple_,sntati_nl _'xpe_'i_nc_. II
'l'hcapproach u_lud by G_uC i_ the BAP has suvura3 s_gnifx-
cant characteristics. These include: (i) the ±nsistonuo o_,
"user pull"--that is _hat the predominant initlativo for
, requesting assista_ should cum_ fro_l|city o_fiuials or com-
munity groups, (2) the "tecl_nulogist in residence" cencsp_--
in whi_._h the person assignee to h,_ip the city is _ me_ber o_
the technical staff of an R&D fac_,lity in tile ima_ediate vici_i_y
off the _ity and is assigned to the o_fioe of the city's chief
executive, (3) continuity of the relationship--the project is
i considered to be much more than a "one-.shot deal" and the
tenure of the technologist in resid_n,,:_e is expected to continue
for some time, (4) high level eo_mnit_ent, high prlority--both
the chie_ executive of the city and the R&D facility ta.ke
an active in_erest, support the proJ[:ct, and give it high
priority relativ to other activities, (5) th desig ation
of a high level city o_._icial to be the interface wit/_ the
teeh;_olegist in resldenco, (6) the avo$lance by the government
facility 4f competition with commercial souxces, (7) the lack
of "stake" by the government facility in substantive issues--
the facility exercises no regulatory authority over thu city
nor is involved in .programmatic relationships--the :'stake" is
only in assisting the city to solve problems, and (8! nonz
intervention in the goverramental operations of the clty. 12
i The request for BAP involvement came from Bernard
Berkowitz, the Mayor's Physical _evelopment Coordinator.
Berkowitz was the City's liaison with Golden and BAP. Golden,
occupied with other BAP projects and realizing that the fire
dispatch project was a major undertaking requiring full-time
attention, sought a GSFC engineer to handle the assignment.
He selected Philip Ya_fee, an.electrical engineer who had
been with Geddard since 1960. Yaffee had worked on a variety
o_ electronics problems and had extensive experienc_ with
writing specifications and monitoring contractors. (Later,
another GSFC staff member, computer expert Harold Theiss,
also became involved in the project.)
Fire Department officials felt that a full computer-.
' aided dispatch and communications system (CAD) should be
considered seriously. Many cities were opting for a CAD.
Learning of the Department's interest, the State and Local
Systems Division of uhe Motorola Company submitted an unso-
_- lieited proposal and arranged for a briefing for City officials
on its capabilities in CAD. The briefing was held in May, 1977
at the Baltimore Hilton Hotel. The Fire Depa_-tment asked
Yaffee to attend.
7
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systam,* the question of h_w to p_c,ca¢,O hnd to b_ an_wo1_d.
To d¢_ s_, a city-wide t_sk f_rce w_ e_tahli_hed with B_?k_w:Ltz
a_ chairman. Mu,i_ership includ_d re[_rouentat:|.vt_s c)f the _'ire
Department, Office of Tel_oxlu,unicatio_s, Planni_g Department,
BoreaL'. of Purchasc_._, Bur'ei_,u of M_nag_ii|ul_t I_f¢_rmati¢_n .qy_t'.emu,
Bureau of Budget and M_llagement _seaz'ch and the _AI_, rupre_
sented hy Yaffee.l_
The first question f,a_i_Ig the task fores was how tu
p_-ocued with plan_ing _Or and _ontrauti_/ for the project.
One option was to eo_'£_aut '_t_.to a single. _ompany all w¢_'k
cor_leotod with tl_e project includi_ig s'Uudy o_ the _._qu±rements,
development of performance criteria and specifications and
development a/,d installat_on O_ hardware and software. The
task force r_Jeeted this option, largnly on the advico of
the Bureau o_ _urchas_sa,%d Yaf£_e; ins_oad, the tasa force
opted for awarding a "study" _ontract for a needs assessment,
development of recommendations for a CAD sys_n and writing
performance specifications. These specifications would form
th_ basis for the Request for Proposal _o_ the. "implem¢:nta_;.o,,"
contracts. Both the study and implementation contraet:s woul_
be competitively bid.
At this point, Yaffce began to render significant
technical assistance. (In this a_tivity, he and Th_:_
worked closely with City o_i¢ials.) Yaf_ee da',_:'op-,J _ae
overall project plan, statement o_ work, and woJ_ flow ehar_,
as well as the specifications for the study oont_:_ct. Yaffee
was also a member o_ the committee which evaluated the pro._osal
for the study contract.19
In addition, Yaffee and Theiss constituted _he technical
evaluation coma%ittee _cr review of contractor proposals for the
implementation contract. Zaffee also played a key role in
guiding Baltimore officials with regard to the scope of th_
implementation contract and methods for buying equipment.
Yaffee strongly r_commended a "turnkey" contract as well aa
a "dedicated" computer for the Fi_'s Dispatch and Communications
System.20 Ha also endorsed suggestions that Baltimore directly
purchase many of the major components of the system, rather
than having the inlplementation contractor do so. Thi_ so-
called "drop ship" approach reduced costs by eliminating
contractor overhead and profit on the $600K equipment D11r-
chases. Xt also insured that City procedures designed to
obtain the lowest possible bid were used. 21
*When the tsrm "CAD" is used in this report, it refers
to a complete communications and computer-aided dispatch
system.
9
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Yaffee a_Id Theiss also guidedPurchas_ and Fire
Department _f_ 'als on questions of r_asonablen_s_ of cost
f_ e(_ulpmer,_, _ertware and mcd%fleatiw_s proposed by the
%implementatmon contractor a_ vendors, m_
Each of these specific BAP activities was considered
vital to the project by Baltimore officials. The participa-
tion of BAP provided Baltimore officials with a sense of
confidence in their managea, ex_t of the project as a _xole.
STATUS OF PROJECT
The CAD project in Balt_ore is divided into three
phases: (i) fixed station conmlunications (completed), (2)
computer-aided dispatch equipment installation (scheduled
for completion by mid-1981), (3) mobile and portable com-
munications (to be completed during 1982). Two bond issues
for partial financing ($1.3 million in 1978; $1.7 million in
1979) were approved by Baltimore voters by substantial margins.
The entLre project is estimated to cost $4 million. Implemen-
tation is proceeding on schedule. No cost overruns or major
technical problems have been experienced.
ROLE OF CONTRACTORS
An important aspect ef CAD was the role of the two con-
tractors. The "study" contract was awarded to Atlantic
Research Corp. of Alexandria, Virginia. The Baltimore evalu-
ation team, of which ¥affee was a m_mber, recommended ARC
because it appeared to have a good grasp of the requirements,
had relevant experience and was the low bidder. The study
contract called for the contractor to do a needs assessment,
to recon_end the approach by which _he implementation phase
should be carried out and to write detailed performance
specifications. 23
ARC's performance of these tasks was viewed by Baltimore
officials with mixed feelings. Although the ARC final report
and specifications were accepted by Baltimore and full pay-
ment was made to the contractor, some Baltimore officzals
were less than satisfied. Some Fire Department staff felt
that ARC personnel spent too little time working at the Fire
Department sites, and did not consult sufficiently with Fire
Department personnel or with Yaffee and Theiss. As a result,
they noted, the initial user needs survey was incomplete, and
the first set of performance specifications as submitted
initially.by ARC was not sufficiently comprehensive and
detalled. _ (The problem with the quality and completeness
of the specifications was considered so serious that the
i0
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Bureau of Purchas_asked ARC to do _re work on tl_em. ARC
responded that this would constitute work beyond the original
scope of the contract, and that an additional $7,000 would
be necessi_atad for this work, which ARC called "interpreting
the specifications." Baltimore officials decided not to
spend the additional money.)25
ARC's work, however, was complemented and suppl_nented
by Yaffee's activities. Yaffee was very interested in getting
the best idea possible of the actual needs of users. (According
to BAP philosophy, this is one of the principal tasks of a
technology agent.) Yaffee and Theiss also "reviewed" the
performance specifications as written by ARC. _n actuality,
Yaffee and Theiss spent considerable time "going back and
forth" with ARC over the specifications, with the result that
the original specifications wW_e significantly modified both
in scope and level of detail. _° The final specifications as
issued in the Request for Proposals were excellent for their com-
prehensiveness, precision and level of detail, according to Fire
Department and Bureau of Purchase officials, as well as Motorola
(the contractor). Motorola officials stated uhat the quality of
the specifications contributed to their ability to pr@Dare
a responsive proposal and to keep cost estimates l_w. Z7 (When
seme other prospective bidders were asked by the Bureau of
Purchases why they did not bid on the implementation contract,
they stated that _he spe--6Tfications were so tight that they
knew they lacked the capability to do the job.*) 28 Only two
proposals from Motorola and Eagle Signal Corp. were received
for the implementation contract, although 55 companies expressed
an interest and 43 attended the bidders conference.
Yaffee and Theiss constituted the technical evaluation
committee for review of the two proposals. They found the
Motorola proposal superior to the proposal submitted by
Eagle Signal Corporation. 29
Motorola was well attuned to the needs of Baltimore for
a CAD. The company had a long relationship with Baltimore
and had kept in close touch with City officials throughout
the late 1970's. Upon learning of the Fire Department's
interest in a CAD, the company sent an unsolicited proposal
to the City and arranged for a briefing of City officials on
its CAD capabilities at the Baltimore Hilton Hotel. This
activity helped Baltimore in its consideration of whether
to go to a CAD and gave Motorola a better understanding of
the needs and preferences of Baltimore officials.30
*Some other firms did net bid because they were tied up by
other jobs.
ii
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The role of Motorola was greater in some respects than
simply that of an implementation contractor. After it was
awarded a contract, Motorola acted as a source of general
advice to Baltimore oz_ matters concerning general management
of the project. For example, Baltimore was concerned with
keeping total costs below $4 million--a figttre which had been
present_/ to the City Council. The Motorola bid was $4.9
million, but in negotiations Motorola, aware of the political
problem, suggested that certain major items of equipment be
purchased by the City directly, thereby reducing the city's
project price to $4.2 million. This so-called "drop ship"
approach resulted in a cost savings for the project of $700,000
to the City, since it reduced overhsad and profit on these items and
resulted in other savings. The strategy was endorsed by the
Purchasing Bureau and by Yaffee. (The endorsement by Yaffee
was conditional on continuing to hold Motorola responsible
for the entire installation--turnkey responsibility--which
was done.) Motorola also advised Baltimore on other phases
of the project, such as the type of auxiliary computing
and communzcations equipment to acquire. ;_ (Subsequently,
Motorola informally complained that direct purchase cf
equipment by Baltimor_ was causing "interaction and interface
problems" and was addang to project costs.) _& The significant
point is that Motorola was. a highly cooperative and involved
contractor, willing to work closely both with Baltimore
officials and Yaffee and Theiss. Relations between Baltimore
and Motorola remain excellent. The project, nearing comple-
tion, is considered to be doing well and no major technical
problems are foreseen.
Acceptance by Fire D_artment Personnel
Acceptance of CAD within the Fire Department appears
good. An in-house, on-the-job training program for present
dispatch personnel is in progress. (These are mainly "limited
duty" personnel who cannot perform firefighting duties due to
injury, illness or other reasons.) It is planned to test
personnel following completion of training. Those unable to
pass will be assigned to other duties, but it is anticipated
that most of the present dispatchers will pass.
The unions--fire officers and fire fighters--have raised
no objections to the training progra_ or to the project itself. 33
ANALYS_S
Technology Application
In the CAD, the problem of the technology application
was straightforward in some respects, but very complex in
12
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others. It was generally agreed that proper application of
a CAD would aid the ability of the Fire Department to respond
to alarms more quickly and effectively. About two dozen U.S.
cities had or were installing CAD in 1977. But there were
major questions on whether and how to proceed. These were:
(1) How badly was CAD needed in _altimore in the face of other
urgent requirements for funds? (2) If it was determined that
th_ need was great enough to warrant funding, how extensive
should the system be? (3) What would be a reasonable cost?
(4) How could the process of installing a CAD be managed so
as to insure successful application, especially in view of
difficulties of CAD in other cities (notably Los Angeles,
Boston and Denver)?
The answers to these questions could not easily be given
by Baltimore officials, especially since they lacked expertise
and experience in this area. For the answers, Baltimore relied
on YafZee and the BAP. Without the BAP input it is doubtful
whether the Mayor would have agreed to back the project. With-
out BAP, the user needs analysis and performance specifications
would have been less comprehensive. Without BAP, costs for the
project probably would have been significantly greater because
(i) BAP endorsement of the "drop ship" approach was a decisive
factor in adopting this approach. (2) The precision and de-
tailed nature o£ the performance specifications helped hold
costs down. Finally, withput BAP, the City might not have
utilized a "turnkey" contract or obtained the versatile computer
or communications equipment which is going into the system.
The BAP role was pervasive. It went beyond technical
assistance. Rather, BAP played a vital role in the City's
decision-making process on whether to apply technology and
how to manage the applications.
The nature of the BAP role becomes clearer when experience
with CAD's in other cities is considered. Several U.S. cities
have installed CAD in the past 5 years. None had technical
advice and guidance from an outside source comparable to that
provided Baltimore through BAP. All contracted with private
consulting firms to perform studies and develop plans and
specifications. Results in these cities has been mixed. _n
some, all went well. In others, there have been serious
problems.* Source of difficulties has been traced to poor
project planning and management and inadequate specifications.
L
*Boston, Denver and Los Angeles have had serious dif-
ficulties with implementation or operation of CAD systems.
New Orleans, Memphis and San Francisco have CAD systems which
are operating successfully, according to Fire Service authori-
ties.
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IA review of CAD experience by researchers for the National
Fire Protection Association indicated that "th_ project
manag_nent during a CAD implementation is particularly com-
plex and critical...th_ failure to understand and to complete
a functional analysis of the overall communications system
can cause significant delays and increase costs. Often, the
analysis of those functions to be automated is skipped, and
little consideration is given to alternatives, tradeoffs,
and adequate perfozmance specifications.
'_t se_ms clear that an independent consultant or project
auditor should also be a m_ber of the project team...it is
essential to have in-house technical staff members who are
experie_nced in real-time, assembly language, or mini-computer
processing (if a dedicated or single purpose mini-computer is
to be used). Often, such personnel are not available, and
the independent consultant can fulfill this role."34
Experience with CAD in other cities shows that it is
possible to install a CAD with good results without an arrange-
ment like BAP. A highly competent consulting firm can provide
the technical guidance and advice needed (e.g., San Francisco
relied on in-house expertise and a consultant contractor).
But unless the city has strong in-house expertise, it must
in effect delegate to the consultant the full responsibility
for planning, designing, and installing the system. An
arrangement like the BAP, on the other hand, provides a margin
of safety for the city. While the city still needs a con-
sultant to pezform the highly detailed work of carrying out
a study, writing detailed plans and specifications and helping
to iron out initial problems, it is not put in the position
of relying totally on the consultant. The R and D facility
provides a review and audit function, which even if it does
not result in significant changes in _he consultant's recom-
mendations, provides the city with a sense of confidence.
In addition, problems may arise because of non-technical
complications, such as satisfaction of needs of diverse users.
A consultant may be new to the city and its specific administra-
tive and policy problems. In an arrangement like the BAP,
the technologist in residence, because of _n undezstanding
of city needs and methods gained over several years can provide
guidance which the consultant may not be able to provide due
to lack of knowledge of institutional relationships. In
addition, an arrangement like BAP provides a city with con-
tinuing access to expertise should problems arise in later
phases of the project, or after project completion when the
consultant contract has long terminated, and the consultant's
team has moved on to work in another city.
In the Baltimore CAD, additions were needed to the
user needs survey and performance specifications. Ha_ they
not been provided by BAP, severe difficulties might have
14
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been encountered during implementation, especially if there
had been more bids for the implementation contract and a company
with less CAD experience or a less close relationship to
Baltimor_ had won the award. Project costs would have also
been higher, especially if _altimore had to hire consultants
to supplement the user needs survey and performance specifications,
and if the specifications and procurement procedures had not
been tightened.
But beyond these specific acts of assistance and guidance,
BAP played a vital role in the decision-making process of the
City. It was a neighbor and trusted partner.
The closeness of the location of GSFC to Baltimore was
seen both by Baltimore and GSFC officials as an important
factor in the effectiveness cf the relationship. As a neighbor
of Baltimore, GSFC has a natural interest in the well being
of the city. Many GSFC employees live in or near Baltimore.
Proximity facilitates quick response to requests for assistance.
GSFC personnel can spend a few hours in a Baltimore City office
and still be available for work that day at the research center.
The long term nature of the relationship facilitates building
a sense of trust and cooperation. Baltimore sees GSFC as more
than a good source of technical advice; rather GSFC has become
a partner in solving city problems.
Is this relationship of proximity and trust necessary
for meaningful contributions by an outside source of technical
guidance? Is the absence of such trust and proximity one of
the reasons for the failure of many attempts at technology
application (transfer) to state and local governments? These
questions will be explored in the conclusion.
Advantages and Drawbacks
From this review of the Baltimore CAD experience, there
appear to be several advantages of having a nearby R and D
facility provide technical assistance to a city on an on-@oing
basis. These include opportunity to aid a city in a signifi-
cant way to solve its technology-related problems and to provide
to a city the specific expertise it needs to deal with tasks
and problems as they arise. For the R and D facility, it
provides a chance to foster technology transfer.
This type of arrangement, however, may have important
drawbacks. Unless special care is taken, the R and D facility
may duplicate the work of private consultants and may be in
.m competition with them. Too much reliance by the city on the
and D facility may thwart the city's capability to develop
in-house technical expertise needed in the long run to deal
! with ts ongoing operations. Although the city may obtain
technical assistance from the R and D facility at little or
15
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no cost, thexa is a cost to the taxpayers on a n_taoxlal
basis. This type of arrangement may encourage cities to
neglecttechnology_ugma_budgst and fiscal provisions for utilizing
The value of the BA_ contribution to CAD, then, resulted
from the trust which Baltimore officials had in GSFC and the
BAP arrangement. Without that trust, BAD personnel would
still have given useful technical help, but they would not
have played a key role An the policy and management decisions,
which, Baltimore officials felt, was the most important BAP
contribution.
Therefore, to put the CAD case in perspective requires
a closer look at the BAP, since had not BAP existed, Baltimore
would not have had NASA help on CAD. The decision-making and
management process--and the outcome--might have been quite
different.
As discussed earlier, BAP had a number of special charac-
teristics, including insistence on "user pull," continuity,
and long-telnn commitment of the "technologist in residence. "
It is difficult to say at what point the sense of "truzt" had
been achieved. The personality and approach of Golden con-
tributed to the building of trust.
Part of the trust was due to the willingness of Gol_en
to listen to City officials and carefully investigate situations
before making a r_commendation. Often, he would question
whether technology would be helpful or appropriate. Above
all, he made a genuine attempt to understand the political,
financial and administrative problems faced by City officials.
At any rate, by 1977 trust had been established and the
assignment of Yaffee, who was universally praised by Baltimore
officials both for his technical expertise and interpersonal
skills, strengthened the bond.
Thus, it was natural for Baltimore officials to look
to BAP, and to rely on its advice beyond the purely technical
realm. (The Fire Department had not had previous contact
with BAP. After a short time, Department officials were
impressed with BAP personnel--Golden, Yaffee and Theiss--and
relied on their advice. Asked if they would call upon BAP
in the future, Fire Department officials responded affirma-
tively.) 36
Therefore, the BAP arrangement was a strong factor in
the CAD technology application.
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Implication@ for Technology App!ications to Urban Government
The Baltimore CAD case makes it clear _hat urban
technology application is difficult and complex even when
the technology in question has been effective in me,_tlng needs
of other cities. This is so for several reasons: (i) Each
city is different and has different needs and ways of carrying
out its urban lifestyle. To be successful, technology applica-
tion must be fitted to the city's u_%ique nature. For exa_%ple,
the CAD system in Baltimore had to be designed to accommodate
call boxes, even though it would have been simpler to elim-
inate theal from the City's streets.* But this was politically
impossible in Baltimore. Therefore, Baltimore had to incor-
porate call boxes in the system and could not utilize as a
model another city's system that did no_ use call boxes.
Similarly, the data base for Baltimore would differ from other
cities, due to differences in distribution of housing and
commercial s_ructures and extent of neighborhood deteriora-
tion. Software design, especially with regard to methods
for accurately identifying fire locations, must be highly
individualized. 37 (2) Each city has varying legal and
administrative requirements and procedures. These in turn
affect the fiscal and procurement processes. What may be
financially or contractually possible in one city may be
illegal or impractical for another. Baltimore had to contend
with a restrictive bond debt limit, a tight project budget
and specific procurement regulations which limited its flexi-
bility and may have reduced the field of bidders for
both the study and the implementation contracts. (Some pro-
spective implementation contract bidders stated that the
incremental funding aspect o_ the contract--necessitated.b_8the splltting of bond votes--made them decid no to id
(3) The nature of use: agencies and interest groups varies
from city to city. Patterns of agency co-operation which
may work in one city will not work in another, and, if tried,
may well damage implementation. (In Baltimore, the Fire
Department and Management Information Bureau could not share
a computer system for storage of data due to different needs
and m_thods of operation. Such a sharing arrangement was
included in early specification drafts, based on practice
in other cities, but was altered due to advice given by
Yaffee and some City offlcials.) 39
*The value of call boxes as fire alarm devices in the
age of the telephone is questioned by some fire officials
and they are being eliminated in some cities, especially since
their presence is a temptation for youths to raise nu/nerous
false alarms.
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Recognition of these differen_os lea_s to the realiza _
tion that technical assistance per se is net enough to insure
that technology will be applied and incorporated. Much more
is needed. BAP personnel were well aware o:_ _he multi-dimen _
sional nature of their tasks.
T}I_ CAD F_OM FOUR PERSPECTIVES
Fire Service Perspective
Events in the BAP CAD implementation program clearly show
thlt it is indispensible for the fire service to have available compe-
tent technical and managerial staff, either _n-house or
through special arrangement with an outside source. BAP
filled this need, although it Gould have been filled by a
consulting firm.
It would have been both difficult and expensive for
Baltimore to duplicate with a consulting firm the many capa-
bilities that BAP brought to the project. Clearly, the Baltimore
"study contract" was not designed to do so. (The role of ARC
actually was quite limited. After delivery of the performance
specifications, its role virtually ceased, especially since
Baltimore did not give ARC a contract modification for "inter-
preting the specifications_" Neither the Fire Department nor
Motorola consulted with ARC after the specifications were
delivered. When Motorola wanted clarification of the perfor-
mance specifications it went to Yaffee and Theiss.) 40
As to cost, the study contract price was 29 thousand dollars.
The cost to San Francisco for its consultant contract for study,
performance specification writing and assistance in supervision
of the mplementation contract was 96 thousand dollars. In
San Francisco three man years were provided by the contractor;
the City of San Francisco _upplied two more years. 41
In view of the problems other cities have encountered, it
appears that from the perspective of the fire serivce, _ BAP-
type arrangement is desirable along with the use of a consultinw
firm. Such an arrangement offers a very wide range of technical
and managerial competence (including experience with high
technology contractors), plus knowledge of the city gained
i from working on other projects. In addition, it offers the
baGk-up of the resources of a major R&D agency, and,if necessary,
of the federal government. (In a n%%mber of other BAP tasks,
experts from federal agencies other than NASA were made avail-
able to Baltimore.) 42
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_r_bba_nTe___chno_____lo_qLTz_nsf_r_rsp,_tlv,_
This case study brings heine the point that both Yin
and Lar_bright make in their recent studies--conditions internal
to the city play a crucial role in determining whether tech-
nology is transferred successfully. Simply having an external
source of help is far fro_ sufficient. Yin stresses the need
for acceptance by city bureaucrats: Th new practice had to
have concrete benefits for service praet_tloners--e.g., conven-
ience, reduced physical effort, greater potential for promotions,
and additional sense of safety on the job. 43
Lambright points out that "to overcome the fragmentation
of local goverrmlent authority requires coalition building.
i
To build coalitions requares changes in technology and in
the city and in its institutions. ''44 This, in turn, requiles
a local "entrepreneur" who can bring divergent political,
administrative, professional and interest group forces together
in support of the new technology. "The entrepreneuz _eed not
be a technically trained inc_ividual, though this helps_ _ow-
ever it is important that he have access _o technical judge-
ment he trusts .... ,,45
The role of organizations attempting to give external
support to urban technology transfer is important, of course,
as both Yin and Lambright recognize. Nevertheless, both
studies conclude that unless the internal factors are appre-
ciated and explicitly related to by the external source,
chances for providing help are sharply diminished. 46
In the Baltimore CAD, the internal conditions for trans-
fer were good. The needed coalitions were already in place
or were built through the efforts of Bond and Berkowitz, who
acted as local "entrepreneurs." Although the leadership of
the Fire Department did not champion CAD prior to the Fire
Board's interest, the department leadership supported the
changes. After initial reservations the Mayor threw his
prestige behind the project. All along the way, Bond and
Berkowitz--although not technically trained--had access to
technical Judgement they could trust. This was of
great help to them in building coalitions and was a key
input into the crucial decisions made by the Mayor and other
top city officials. BAP personnel took pains to understand
and work with internal factors within the Baltimore city
gover n/ne.nt.
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Public Adminlstr_tlon per_ectivf_
From the sta_polnt of public admir_istr_tion, th_ CA_
case is of special interest because of the unique approach
used for technology applleation. The diffQrence was noted
by the National Academy of Public _Iministration in its
evaluation of BAD o£ March, 1977:
"The BAP is particularly challenging since there a_e
few, if any, precedents upon which it can draw. The non-
advocacy, diplomatic and _acil_tative f_atures of t_ Baltit_ore
Applications Project have been apparent to the (NAPA) panel.
Tb_ low-key problem-oriented approach for transferring tech-
nological ideas is a distinctive departure £rom the more
publicized, glamorous "hawking" approaches. ''47
The NAPA report commented favorably on the BAP emphasis
on the "process" of technology application rather than on a
blind belief that applying technology can solve problems:
"The choice oZ technology which might be applied was to
be the ¢iuy official's choice and the problems were those of
the particular department or agencies involved. This meant
that the technology agent was to be more of a coordinator
or facilitator than a typical project director, i.e., he was
to be a technological resource and not a manager or impleatentor
of technology. Although specific applications of technology
(and hopefully some applications of aerospace technology) were
expected, _hese were not to be the principal objectives o£ the
project. Rather, BAP was viewed more as an experiment or
1 demonstration pro_ect with wh%ch to determine if a city could
use the technology agent in the role of a "technologist in
residence."48
The CAD case provides an excellent example of this type
of institutional approach in full practice. BAP personnel
were much more th._ technical assistants; they were an integral
part of the decision-making and management processes, yet,
their role was never that of project director, project manager
or advocate or implementer of technology. This is especially
significant because CAD was a large scale, politically sensi-
tive project with heavy involvement of commercial sources;
BAP was involved in the implementation stage. Prior to CAD,
BAP had concentrated on tasks emphasizing problem identification
and needs assessment. _n its 1977 report, NAI_A had criticized
this emphasis on the ground that the true value of the BAP
approach to cities could not be Known until it was used in
a politically sensitive implementation project in which
commercial sources were involved.
2O
"Golden has been very cautious in avoiding t_sks which
would place the BAP in the position of providln_ servi_e_
that are available on a commercial basis. The panel does not
quarrel with this general policy, but questions the rigidity
of %nterpretatlon, To the extent possible, advice and
assistanoe should be provided agenoy officials, carefully
tracking progress on such tasks. This hesltance has been
most notable in the One field where NASA probably has the
most to offer in the way of teohnlaal competenoe--oommuniaa-
tlons....
Those tasks which appear to impinge on political sensl-
tivities or carry the possibility of some involvement in
implementation have been oarefully avoided. Some of these
may be problems of high priority. 'Playing it safe' praoludes
) the opportunity to test technology application, and may tend,
over time, to limit applications to problems of secondary
importance. If the purpose of the BAP is to learn, some
risks must be taken."49
That BAP could get heavily involved in a project llke
CAD, while retaining its role as a resource, (not an implemen-
tot or director) and while retaining the respect and trust of
city officials is of significance to those concerned with
developing new public management approaches to technology
application. The "county agent" has often been put forward
as a model for technology application to state and local
government, and some technology transfer programs have been
patterned, in part, on that model. 50
The BAP, because it is a continuous institutional, pro-
! oess-oriented approach with objective trusted agents, is
closer to, though not patterned after, the county agent model
than many of the other urban technology transfer programs.
The county agent has developed over the years into a
trusted, objective source of assistance and advice--an integral
part of the farmer's daily environment and approach to work;
the county agent is "always there" and the same person may
serve in the same location for many years. The technology
agents in some urban technology transfer programs are often
temporary and are considered experimental. Funding is uncertain.
They will be there only as long as they can show a track record
of technology adoption. There may be a tendency to seek out
areas for technology application whether or not the city is
ready, politically, financially or psychologically, and whether
or not the technology is a "good fit" to the city's physical
needs.
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i_
In v£aw of the racan_ passage of the Stevanson-Wydler
_111 (PL 96-480), the RAP approach may serve as an especially
useful model Zc_ other federal R&D laboratories, gut federal
laboratory officials must be eens£tlve to the need to wc=k wi_h
Oity officials in building an environment conducive to technology
application. CeEtalnly, this case study and the _peEiance
with DAP show the _mportancs of developing internal ins_4._utional
infrastructU_eo Bo_ ¥in and Lambright have noted that _nternal
conditions are at least as important as technlaal assistance
as deteEmlnants of successful technology application.
As ¥1n noted with regard to routinisation of numerous
hardware technology applications in many cities:
, "In contrast to all these internal conditions, external
financial and technical assistance in the foz_u of federal
grants and awards wore consistently found to be unrelated
to the degree of routlnizatlon. This did not mean, however,
that local agencies could as easily innovate without such
external assistance. Rather, the lack of relationships was
due to the inability to distinguish between two very different
condltions--whera local officials actively pursue external
assistance, and where such assistance is the result of inltla-
tives by a federal granting agency oE other external agent.
External asslstanca may in. fact be very _mportant to routlnlza-
tion if such assistance follows local initiatives and matches
local needs and agendas. "51
And, as Lam_rlght points out_
"Innovations that reach incorporation are those _hat
represent locally-initlated efforts in response to problems
and/or opportunities perceived locally by line agency officials,
elected and appointed pollcy-makers, and clientele groups.
The principal institutional mechanism that needs to be identi-
I fled to ensure adoption, implementation, and incorporation isa strong, locally-based, bureaucracy-_entered coalition. It
follows that federal technology transfer policy-makers should
work toward helping bureaucratic and other entrepreneurs build
professionally competent agencies. These agencies should he
supported at _ha local level by additional expertise, poll-
ticians, and a continuing clientele market fo_ the service
p=ovlded by the innovation....
What we are arguing is not only that federal officials
become actively involved in promoting such coalitions, but,
at the very least, that they should also be increasingly aware
that the primary barriers to innovation at the local level
are multiple, complex, and interconnected. They must think
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abou_ the user-agency in the conteKt of its internal and
external support systems. By strengthening ouch support
systems (agency capacity, federal programs, supplier industry,
in_erlocal and in_Ealocal televisors), th@_ can work to build
an infrastructure for urban Innovation. TM
In the CAD project, Yaffee and Theiss were working
partners with city officials end contractors in virtually all
phases of the CAD project. They provided essential technical
input for major decisions, participating in evaluation and
reviews conducted by the city, including procurement source
evaluations and supplied assistance to supplement work of
clty officials and contractors when needed. Their role was
one of interaction, co_.laboration and facilitation of the
by which technology appllc&tion took place. The role
was so important that it made the process much more effective
than it would have been without BAP involvement and insured
a successful technology application. _n short, BAP pEovlded
a missing element in the institutional infrastructure of
Baltimore city government for applying technology.
lnnoTatio _ Perspective
The previous discussion makes it clear that innovation
in urban government does not occur spontaneously. It must be
nurtured, and a conducive environment must be established.
The CAD case illustrated these points. The impetus for
innovation came from the Fire Board, but there was skepticism,
and hesitancy among other city agencies and officials. Before
the CAD was adopted, it was necessary to develop a climate
favorable to innovation. The BAP played a key role in
developing the climate, both in a general sense through increas-
ing the awareness of Baltimore officials over the years _o
the potential of technolog_and specifically through the
information provided by Yaffee on the need for and applica-
bility of CAD to Baltimore's problems. After adoption,
innovations must be implemented and incorporated (routinized)
before they s_ar_ contributing to the welfare of a city. In
many cities, innovations are abandoned because of imDlementatlon
or incorporation difficulties. 53 In the CAD case, B_P was
crucial in the implementation stage, as evidenced by BAP input
to the study and performance specifications and the decision-
making process on selection of contractors and project manage-
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ment. The availability of SAP during inoorporation, if
needed, will also help innovation at this final stage.
SAP, with its emphasis on tsohnology pull, on the
_of teohnology application and involvement in develop-
ernal infraetruoture, fostered a ollmate for innovation
in Baltimore. Other programs of external assistanoe to uitles
should take note of the experience of SAP. in fostering innova-
tion. The key to innovation ks not outside help, but An the
involvement of key persons at the local level. As Lambrlght
puts it:
"The real task lies, as always, at the local level.
Unless there ks the spirit and reality of entrepreqqurship,
a push for innovation from outside leads nowhere. "_
CONCLUSION
The CAD case provides a number of important insights
into the process of urban technology application and the role
of technical assistance by an external source:
(i) In this case, it was clear that applying the tech-
nology was not primarily a problem of developing new technology
or modifying existing technology. Rather, _he problems were
in determining the applicabillty of the technology, obtaining
support for adoption and managing the implementation and
incorporation stages. While technical expertise was needed
in each of these steps, the primary contribution of the
external source of assistance (SAP) was in decision-making
and management processes.
(2) in view of this "process" need, the BAP was able to
be of crucial assistance to Baltimore because of the special
I characteristics of SAP, which emphasize user pull, long term
commi_uent, involvement in building coalitions and infra-
structure and, as demonstrated by CAD, participation in important
implementation projects.
(3) Urban technology asslstan_s from an external source
must include more than purely techniual guidance. Policy,
financial and management problems pose the greatest barriers
to technology application for alty officials. The external
source should be sensitive to these problems and while not
taking s_ands, should be willing to help in the processes
required to resolve them.
(4) Building a sense of "trust" between the external
source and the city is very important in facilitating tech-
nology application or avoiding mis-application.
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(5) The city's proximity to the external te_hnolegy
is Important(although probably not absolutely essential)
in the technology application process. Proximity permits a
greater degree of institutional (as well as personal) inter-
action between the facility provi41ng assistance and the city.
If physical proximity is not possible, arrangements to sub-
stitute for its advantages should be worked out. These might
include a firm, regular schedule of frequent visits by the
technology agent, regular TV teleconfeEsnces among the
technology agents and city officials between visits and a "hot
llne" telephone connection for response to urgent questions.
(6) The facility providing assistance and the city
receiving it should work toward the goal of "partnership
in solving problems", rather than emphasizing the distinction
of "external" and "internal" parties. The formal agreement
which underlies the relationship should be couched in "partner-
ship" rather than in "quid pro quo" terms.
(7) WhAle a city may he able to make a successful
technology applioatlcn without a rAP-type arrangement, chances
for success are increased when such an institutional cooperative
arrangement is utilized. The use of a consulting farm to
handle detailed study and specifications work is reccnunended.
Even the most capable consultant contractor however may be
unable to provide advice and assistance on certain aspects
of a problem, especially when these involve input foe decision-
making on policy, management or procurement issues.
25
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NOTES
1. Zn the pas_ _an yea_e, several U.S. uJ.ties have installed compute=
aided =_unica_lons and dispatch systems (CAD). San Francisco's
system Is operating well and is considered successful by Fize Pro-
cec_,on auCho=iCiee. Successful systems are operating also :in Memphis
and New Orleans. Letter diced May 4, 1977 from Philip Yaffee Co
Th_as Burke, Chief, BalCl:ore Fire Depaz_nc. The author of this
_pox_ viewed Che San Francisco CAD in operation and inCe=viewed
Robert Rose, Chief, Planning and ReseaJ:ch, san F=anoisco Fire Depa:C-
numC, on April 16, 1980.
2. Los Angeles experienced several difgioulCies wiCh ice CAD. Al,',',',',',',',',',_hough
planning began in 1968 and a con_._acC for lnsCallaCion was awarded in
1971, the _sCem was sac ape=cOlonel as of May 1981. _ Cases held
1980, CAD response crime was 112 seconds oolpe=ed CO manual system
:upnnse CiEe of 103 seconds. Difficulties have been aCC:ibuCed Co:
(1) sCaz_ing Coo early in Ce_ of state of _he arc and Crying Co push
the technology Coo fast; (2) poor pergozmance specifications; (3) a
dispute with the implementation contractor over the extent ¢_ cone=actor
=espons_biliCy for a "cuEnkey" operation; (4) delays in building a city
hall annex in which the CAD equipment was Co be housed. Site visit
CO Los Angeles Fire Department and interview by author wiCh Chief
Durkee, CAD Praise, L.A.F.9., April 17, 1980 and telephone interview
of May 8, 1981. BeaCon, Denver and Detroit have also had serious
problems in planning for or Installing CAD. See ¥affee letter of
May 8, 1977, oP. ci_. Telephone interview with ogficials of Detroit
Fire Depart.mane, April 16, 1981. Zn D_uroiC an attempt was made Co
have bach the Police and Fi=e DepaE_nenCs use the same CAD. This
was noC feasible.
3. For discussions of Chase issues, see W. Henry Lan_righC, Governin_
Science and Technology (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976), Oh. 4,
and To_ Transfer Co Cities: Processes of Choice aC _he Local
Love.._._l(Boulder, Colorado: WesCview P_esa, 1979), asp. Ch. i and 9_
Rich_d Nelson, The Moon and the Ghetto (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977).
4. H.J. Peaks and T.$. Golden, "The Baltimore Applications Project: An
ExperlmanC in Technology Tranfer," 1979 En_Ineerin_ Management Confecence
Record (Washln_on, D.C.: Institute of Electrical Electronics Engineers,
1979) p. 55. The technology agent assigned co New York City was a
con_.TaoCor employee. _. Thomas Golden was a c_reer NASA scarf
member. Zn con_-rasCCO the SAP, the arrangement for technical assistance
from NASA co New York was noC based on a formal agreement calling for
a long-teEm relaClonohip. When an accident (unrelated Co his duties as
technology agent) caused the death of the New York City technology agent
in 1975, he was noC =eplacsd and the a=rangemenC ended.
5. Memorandum of Understandin_ NASA-Baltimore Applications Project,
dated April 25, 1974.
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6. _bid.
m
7. Laatbr£ghc, Technology Transfer Co Cities (see Note 3).
8. a._. Yin eC al., Tinkering wit h the S_scem, Technolo_ _nncvation An
SCats .and Local Gove_aenC (Ca_bcidge, Mass., Heath Lexington, 1977).
Also see ¥in, "Life Histories of Znnovationms How New Practices Become
Routinized," Pu_llc Admlniscratlon Review (jan./Feb., 1981), pp. 21-28.
9. For a discussion of Chess questlons, see Science and TechnologY:
A_nual Re_ to The Con_regs of the National Science Foundation
(Waehln_on, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., June, 1980), pp. 45-51. As the report
s_ates: "Some analysts, no_ing the general grus_ratlon on all sides
with _he aceompllshnmn_.g of Federal dissemination systems, urge a
grea_er conlni_nent to capacity building. Others, interpreting the
data differently end noting the llmits of Federal resources and a
need _o keep _he Federal Govlrnmen_ doing wha_ it apparently can do
best, suggest _hat a concentration on research and development and
diesemlnat_on is more appropriate. There is no empirical evidence
_o resolve thls arg_unen_." FOE de,ailed analyses of t/flee different
views, see Feller, Z. "Science and Technology in State end Local
Governmenus: Problems and Oppor_uniCies." Paper prepeed for _.he
National Science Foundatlon, The Five-Year Outlook: Problems, ODpor-
tunitles r and Constraints in Science and Technolo_, Vol. I_, June
1979, and ¥1n, R. "Science and Technolo_ in Sta_e and Local Govern-
meets: The Federal Role," Paper prepared for the NaClonal Science
Foundation, The Five-Yea_ _uClo.ok: Prcblems_ O_por_unities_ and Con-
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